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In this article, we use a new game-based tool to evaluate the immediate and
longer term behavioral change potential of three different payments for ecosys-
tem services (PES) delivery mechanisms: direct payments for individual perfor-
mance, direct payments for group performance, and insurance. Results from
four rural shifting-cultivation dependent communities in Lao PDR suggest
that easily understood group-oriented incentives yield the greatest immediate
resource-use reduction and experience less free-riding. Group-based incentives
may succeed because they motivate participants to communicate about strate-
gies and coordinate their actions and are perceived as fair. No incentive had
a lasting effect after it ceased, but neither did any crowd out the participants’
baseline behavior. Temporary reductions in resource dependence may provide
a buffer for development of new livelihoods and longer term change. Games
like the one developed here can help policy makers appropriately target envi-
ronmental incentive programs to local contexts and teach program participants
how incentive schemes work.
Introduction
When forest-derived greenhouse gas emissions are
avoided, the benefits are worldwide, but the burden of
reduced forest resource availability is local. Protected
areas are an important defense against deforestation, but
additional lands are required to meet international con-
servation goals (Mora & Sale 2011). Fortunately, there is
ample evidence that communities can self-organize to
manage natural resources like forests (Ostrom 1990;
Hayes & Ostrom 2005). When conservation benefits
accrue outside of a community (like global climate
regulation from carbon sequestration or water sparing
for downstream consumers), and burdens fall on local
resource users, compensation for their incurred costs is
important. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are an
attractive policy option that promote resource use reduc-
tions. PES is a central mechanism in “reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation” (REDD+)
to motivate sustainable forest management (Engel et al.
2008; Pattanayak et al. 2010). When implemented with
sensitivity to local conditions, performance-based PES
may bring benefits locally and more broadly. However,
research into how best to deliver incentives is in its
infancy (Wunder 2008). In this article, we use a forest-
framed experimental game to address these questions in
the context of shifting cultivation landscapes in rural Lao
PDR.
A basic question about PES is how to best deliver in-
centives to local users. Direct cash payments (either to
a group or individual) are perhaps the simplest option
(Alston et al. 2013; Loft et al. 2014). Technical assistance,
insurance against crop failure, contributions to commu-
nal services, and access to credit are other possibilities
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(Engel et al. 2008; Wong 2014; Chantarat 2011; Yang et al.
2015; To et al. 2012). Some programs combine two or
more of these options. Empirical and experimental ev-
idence about these mechanisms’ effectiveness is mixed
(Narloch et al. 2012).
A common concern is that PES may “crowd out” re-
source users’ intrinsic motivation to protect resources,
undermining long-term policy goals (Frey & Jegen 2001;
Muradian et al. 2013). Once incentives end, targeted pop-
ulations may lose motivation to conserve, and degrade re-
sources below preprogram conditions. Crowding out hap-
pens in some experimental and real-life settings, mostly
when the intervention is an externally imposed regula-
tion (Ca´rdenas et al. 2000; Frey & Jegen 2001; Kerr et al.
2012). Conversely, interventions could instill new habits
(Rode et al. 2015) or provide capital for new livelihoods
(e.g., De Mel et al. 2012), reducing long-term resource
dependence. This outcome, known as “crowding in,” has
also been observed in some studies (e.g., Travers et al.
2011; Narloch et al 2012; Lopez et al. 2013). Research
into which policy features lead to crowding in or crowd-
ing out is ongoing (Rode et al. 2015). A preliminary list
includes who initiated the incentives, framing of the in-
centive to the community, the delivery mechanism, and
complementary programs (Lopez et al. 2013; Murtihno
et al. 2013).
PES incentives must consider the cultural and envi-
ronmental context of resource-based livelihoods. Here,
we examine different incentives to shifting cultivators
dependent on unpredictable rainfall. Shifting cultivation,
also known as swidden, is a form of rotational agriculture
central to the food security of millions in tropical regions
worldwide (Van Vliet et al. 2012; Minang et al. 2014).
Its practitioners are frequently disadvantaged minority
peoples with traditional resource rights recognized
by themselves and their neighbors, but not always by
governments (Fox et al. 2009; Padoch et al. 2007; Kenney-
Lazar 2013). Swidden is often misrepresented as unpro-
ductive (Fox et al. 2009), and conflated with poverty and
deforestation, in spite of growing evidence that dynamic
agroforest mosaics provide environmental services, forest
products, and biodiversity habitat (Rerkasem et al. 2009,
Bruun et al. 2013; Magnuszewski et al. 2015). Shifting
cultivation has unique complexities among PES-targeted
systems. First, in contrast to situations (like watershed
management) where most environmental benefits accrue
outside of targeted communities, agricultural deintensifi-
cation delivers improved soil fertility and other benefits to
swidden farmers, but the temptation remains to dispro-
portionately capture benefits, harming the wider com-
munity. Second, swidden is typically rain-fed, making it
vulnerable to drought and requiring incentives targeted
to reduce livelihood uncertainties. Nascent REDD+ trials
in Laos have largely adhered to the national development
discourse targeting swidden stabilization to align poverty
reduction with national environmental goals (Dwyer &
Ingalls 2015). Our work sits at the nexus of these issues,
making it particularly relevant for policy makers.
In this study, we assess potential PES mechanisms for
their immediate and longer-term impacts using a forest-
framed experimental game in four swidden-practicing
communities in northern Laos. Participants decide how
much land to clear and plant, balancing the need for food
and income with potential weather-related crop failures.
This mirrors real-life dilemmas faced by shifting cultiva-
tors who may remain dependent on swidden, but might
restrain their forest use if buffered against threats like
drought. Because incentive programs eventually end, this
study tracks cultivation in a postincentive period. Partic-
ipants communicate before making decisions, reflecting
the reality of close-knit rural communities. We test three
specific incentive mechanisms: individually-directed pay-
ments (IP), group-based payments (GP), and insurance
(INS). To our knowledge, no previous study has com-
pared these incentives and their postincentive efficacy in
the context of shifting cultivation. We seek to answer the
following questions:
(1) Which incentive best reduces resource use in-
tensity?
(2) Which incentive has the biggest lasting impact
after incentive programs end?
(3) Do players’ communication, motivation, and
fairness perception explain incentive outcomes?
(4) How do individual attributes like age, leader-
ship, resource dependence, and education affect
participation in and lasting impact of PES incen-
tives?
Direct payments outperformed insurance and group-
level payments reduced incentive-round cultivation
better than individual payments. No postincentive
crowding out or crowding in was observed under any
mechanism. Increased communication, cooperation,
and perceived fairness under the group payment appear
linked to its success. Individual socioeconomic traits had
little relation to within-game decisions.
Methods
We addressed these questions with a forest-framed
game (see Supplementary information for a detailed
description) in which groups of eight participants indi-
vidually and simultaneously decided how many patches
(up to 10 per round) to cultivate in a stylized forest
with space for 100 agricultural plots. As in real-world
shifting cultivation, a new area of forest was used in each
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Figure 1 An example round of the shifting cultivation game. The left side of the figure represents the forest before cultivation with 100 available patches.
The right side shows a hypothetical round of cultivation with a different color for the patches belonging to each player. The total cultivation by all players
in this example is 44 patches, meaning 56 patches remain in the forest. In this example, player 1 would earn 7 × 56 × 1 = 392 points if rainfall is poor, or
7 × 56 × 3 = 1176 if the rainfall is abundant. Full details of the game mechanics and payoff structure are found in the Supporting Information.
round. Open communication was always allowed, but
cultivation decisions were private. Individual earnings
increased with plots cultivated, but decreased with group
total cultivation, setting up a common pool resource
dilemma. This reflects the real-world tradeoff where
planting more cash crops comes at the expense of fallow
forests that provide nontimber products crucial to diet
and nutritional diversity. Environmental unpredictability
also impacted earnings, with payouts depending on ran-
domly generated rainfall. Example payout calculations
are shown in Figure 1. The game had three stages of eight
rounds each: preincentive, incentive, and postincentive.
The preincentive stage serves as a control for measuring
two outcomes: (1) the “incentive effect,” or the differ-
ence between pre- and during-incentive agricultural land
use, and (2) the “lasting effect,” the difference between
pre- and postincentive cultivation (Figure 2). During the
incentive rounds, one of three mechanisms was tested:
an “individual payment” (IP) made directly to any player
cultivating 3 patches, a group payment (GP) made
directly to each player if the entire group cultivated
24 patches, and insurance (INS) that guarantees any
player cultivating 3 patches a payoff equivalent to
a harvest with good rainfall, even if rains fail. At the
end of the game, all players received tangible goods
proportioned to their in-game earnings. Each mechanism
was implemented with a separate group of eight players
in each of four rural communities in northern Lao PDR
(Table S1). The study had a total of 96 participants (eight
players, three treatments, four villages).
To ensure fair comparisons, the incentives had identi-
cal cultivation levels at the social optimum (six patches
in the pre- and postincentive stages and three during
Figure 2 An idealized diagram showing the basic structure and outcome
variables in the shifting cultivation game. The game is divided into three
stagesofeight roundseach. In stages1and3, there isnoexternal incentive
to limit cultivation, althoughacooperativegroupseeking tomaximize their
earnings would still do so. During stage 2, one of three possible incentives
is offered as ameans to reduce cultivation. Cultivation levels in stage 1 are
the baseline against which choices in stages 2 and 3 are measured. This
baseline allows direct comparison of groups that have different inherent
cultivation levels. We use the term “incentive effect” to refer to the impact
of the incentive while it is active (stage 2), and “lasting effect” to mean the
impact of the incentive after it has ended. While this diagram shows both
effects as reducing cultivation (as hypothesized), it is possible for either or
both effects to be in the opposite direction.
the incentive stage) and individual optimum (always 10
patches). Expected payoffs were identical at the indi-
vidual optimum, and nearly identical at the social opti-
mum (Table S3). For practical reasons discussed in the
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Figure 3 (A) Mean cultivation as a function of game stage and incentive type. The incentive is only applied during stage 2. (B) The incentive effect
(change in cultivation) between the first (preincentive) and second (incentive) game stages. Negative numbers mean cultivation decreased relative to
the preincentive rounds. The letters at the top of the figure show statistical differences at the P < 0.05 level assessed using a Mann–Whitney test. Stars
indicate groups whose mean was significantly different from zero (Mann–Whitney test with P < 0.05). (C) The lasting effect after incentives end. Groups
were not statistically different from one another (Kruskal–Wallis test, P = 0.255). No groups had a lasting effect that was statistically different from zero
at the P = 0.05 level; the group payment incentive was closest with P = 0.142. (D) The within-round standard deviation of players’ cultivation decisions
during the incentive rounds by incentive type. Small letters indicate statistical differences among groups (Analysis of Variance, F = 22.372, n = 96,
P < 0.0001; Tukey’s HSD, P < 0.0001).
Supplementary information, INS had a slightly higher
social-optimal payoff, 4.3% above GP and IP. This bal-
ance also ensured equal earning opportunity among the
different groups. During all rounds, two observers inde-
pendently rated intragroup communication on an ordinal
scale from 0 to 3 and assessed who (if anyone) was the
group’s leader. Following the game, players were individ-
ually asked whether they were motivated by the incen-
tive, if they perceived it as fair and how much time they
spend in real forests. Demographic data about the players
(age, wealth, education, sources of livelihood, household
size) were collected by a separate team that visited the
villages in the 2 weeks before the games. Further
methodological details and analytical methods are pre-
sented in the Supporting Information.
Results
Average individual cultivation during the preincentive
stage was 6.64 patches/round, statistically higher than
the social optimum of 6 (Mann–Whitney test, M =
6.64, SD = 2.53, n = 96, P = 0.0037; Figure 3A), but
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much lower than the individual optimum of 10. As
expected, during the preincentive stage, cultivation was
identical among the incentive types (Kruskal–Wallis test,
χ2 = 2.357, df = 2, P = 0.308). The incentive effect
differed significantly among mechanisms (Kruskal–Wallis
test, χ2 = 15.181, df = 2, P = 0.0005), with GP and
IP showing a bigger decrease in forest use than INS
(Figure 3B). Under GP, cultivation was indistinguishable
from the social optimum of 3, but was significantly
higher than this value for IP and INS (Table S5). Postin-
centive cultivation always rebounded to preincentive
levels (Figures 3A and C, Table S4); the lasting effect was
indistinguishable among mechanisms (Kruskal–Wallis
test, χ 2 = 2.732, df = 2, P = 0.255). Postincentive
cultivation was near the social optimum of 6 for all
incentives (Figure 3A), but all were at least marginally
different from this value (Table S6). Although equitable
use of the forest resource occurred sometimes, individual
cultivation frequently deviated from the mean group
decision. Incentive-stage cultivation was most equitable
under GP (Figure 3D).
Players communicated similarly under all three incen-
tives during the pre- and post incentive stages (permu-
tation tests, P < 0.005; Figure 4A). During the incentive
stage, GP groups showed a significant spike in commu-
nication (Figure 4A). In postexperiment surveys, GP par-
ticipants were more likely than IP or INS players to re-
port that the incentive was fair and motivated them to
reduce harvesting (Figures 4B and C; exact binomial tests,
P < 0.05).
Individual covariates (age, gender, years of education,
family land ownership, time spent in real forests, house-
hold size, and observed in-game leadership) showed
minimal relationships with harvesting levels. Time spent
in the forest was the only significant (and positive)
predictor of preincentive cultivation (Table S7). How-
ever, when village differences were controlled for, this
relationship grew more complicated. Forest visitation re-
mained a significant predictor of in-game cultivation and
education also became a significant, positive, predictor
of cultivation (Table S7). Cultivation decisions relative to
other players in the same group showed no significant
relationship with any of these variables (Table S8).
Discussion
This study has revealed how shifting cultivators respond
to different PES incentive structures using a forest-
framed experimental game. Overall, the participants
from these four villages cooperated consistently through-
out the game. In no instance did any group fully adopt
the uncooperative strategy of cultivating the maximum
allowable. On the contrary, mean cultivation levels were
Figure 4 (A) Communication among players as a function of incentive
type and experimental stage. Communication was assessed by two in-
dependent observers. Small letters refer to significant differences (see
Supporting Information) among incentives within each stage (before, dur-
ing, and after incentive), but not across stages. (B) Percentage of players
reporting in a postgame survey that the incentive schememotivated them
tocultivate fewerpatches. (C) Percentageof players reporting in individual
postgame surveys that they felt the incentive scheme was fair. In (B) and
(C), small letters indicatesignificantdifferences (P<0.05)amonggroupsas
determined using exact binomial tests (see Supplementary information).
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remarkably close to the social optimum for most game
stages and incentives (Figure 3B). This may be due in part
to communication being allowed throughout the game, a
realistic feature not always included in field experiments.
However, these average outcomes mask substantial vari-
ation among players’ decisions (Figure 3D). Free-riding
happened in spite of seemingly cooperative group-level
averages, although among-player harvesting variation
was lowest for the GP incentive (Figure 3D). Our results
show that incentives’ impacts depend on more than
potential financial gain. Although the three incentives
had virtually identical payoff structures, a payment con-
tingent on group-level choices (GP) reduced cultivation
more than an otherwise identical payment with only an
individual-level performance requirement (IP). This may
be explained by players’ increased communication and
perceptions of incentive fairness. In turn, both of these
direct payment incentives outperformed an insurance
incentive (INS) which caused no discernable change in
cultivation practices.
Group- and individual-level incentives have complex
impacts (Beersma et al 2003). Our finding that group
payments outperformed individual payments is congru-
ent with some (Travers et al. 2011), but not all (Narloch
et al. 2012), previous research. Intragroup dependency
promotes successful common pool resource management
outcomes (Frey & Rusch 2013), and is clearly demon-
strated in Lao swidden systems which rely on kinship
ties, reciprocity, and risk-coping dependency (Akihiko
& Chaleunsinh 2015). Compared to the IP and INS
incentives, GP players lose more when free-riding occurs,
but the free-rider gains no additional benefit. In spite of
harsher consequences of free-riding, players reported GP
to be more fair than either IP or INS in postgame surveys.
This perception has at least three nonmutually exclusive
explanations: (1) it was impossible for some players to
receive the bonus payment while others do not, (2)
the theoretical risk of bigger free-riding losses did not
affect actual payoffs, and (3) decisions were the result
of mutual agreement among the players. Intragroup
dependence may drive the spike in discussion during the
GP incentive and the increased motivation reported in
postexperiment surveys. Previous social dilemma exper-
iments report that communication promotes information
sharing (Bornstein 1992) and the forging of group
identity (Pavitt 2011). Additionally, communication
motivates participants to focus on collective welfare
above individual outcomes (Bicchieri 2002). That group
decisions benefitted all members may explain why more
cooperation emerged under GP (Travers et al. 2011). This
interpretation is consistent with the increased commu-
nication during the GP rounds and the higher reported
motivation. Regardless of the particular explanation, it
is noteworthy that at least one experimental study has
found the opposite result. Narloch et al. (2012), using
an agriculture-framed common pool resource game in
the highlands of Peru and Bolivia, found that individual
rewards promoted conservation action more effectively
than group rewards. However, multiple games were run
in parallel with no communication, preventing emer-
gence of a group identity through information sharing
and decision coordination. Taken together, these findings
suggest that policy makers should consider intragroup
dependence as a key feature of PES interventions.
Why the insurance incentive was ineffective is not
immediately clear. In theory, it provides nearly identical
benefits to the direct payment incentives. However,
insurance is not yet common in rural Laos, although
the national government is gradually introducing crop
insurance (Lao PDR Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
2010). In contrast, Lao communities are familiar with
direct incentives based on communal performance (e.g.,
village revolving funds for livestock) and individual
performance (e.g., interest-free microloans). Further,
the relative complexity of insurance, combined with
the low numeracy of many players, could mean that its
benefits were not always apparent. Savings groups are a
more common risk-coping strategy than insurance and
other forms of network finance (Akihiko & Chaleunsinh
2015). In addition, some case studies find confusion
and indifference among participants faced with complex
institutions and incentives (e.g., Scheberle 2000). This
does not mean insurance incentives should never be
used, but does suggest policy makers should view them
with caution. Participants may require help understand-
ing insurance programs. Games like ours, framed to
local contexts, could be useful training tools and can be
modified for linear resources like irrigation systems.
In spite of the significant incentive effect for the direct
payment groups, no incentive showed a significant
positive or negative postprogram lasting effect. The GP
incentive came tantalizingly but inconclusively close to
a lasting cultivation reduction, illustrating the difficulty
of achieving long-term impacts within a finite time
frame and budget. However, this result should not be
viewed pessimistically. Although no incentive had clear
lasting cultivation reductions, neither did any incentive
show lasting cultivation increases. We saw absolutely
no evidence of crowding out, a result in agreement with
most previous studies of incentive-based (as opposed
to disincentive-driven) interventions (Rode et al. 2015).
Crowding in is still a possible outcome of such incentives.
Due to the necessary simplicity of our game, we could
only assess direct behavioral change, but incentives
can also promote long-term economic changes, as seen
in research on development via nonagricultural labor,
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technology adoption, and cash transfers (De Mel et al.
2012). However, postincentive impacts cannot be taken
for granted, so policy design should include pathways
from medium-term gains to longer term sustainability.
By reducing dependence on forest for shifting cul-
tivation, PES could result in more forests and fallows
within the landscape via two complementary routes.
One is less land dedicated to shifting cultivation, and
hence more land reserved for forest or other uses (land
sparing). The second is less frequent rotation, and hence
older fallows. Both mechanisms would bring benefits for
carbon sequestration, biodiversity, and other ecosystem
services if burdens on communities are offset with PES.
While these pathways are beyond the scope of our
study, both outcomes are consistent with our results. The
real-world impact of incentives could be land sparing,
increased rotation time, or both, depending on the policy
implementation and local preferences.
As in all game-based studies, the external validity of
results is difficult to definitively address. That players
who visited real forests more also cultivate more in
the context of the game, even when these variables’
covariation among villages is accounted for, shows the
behavioral validity of the experiment (sensu Handberg
and Angelsen 2015). Our results are relevant not just
for shifting cultivation communities, but wherever
incentive programs target rural resource users. Simple
incentives that players understand (unlike insurance)
and intragroup dependence appear to promote suc-
cess, particularly when they encourage communication
among participants. These findings show that swidden
communities are capable partners in incentive programs
encouraging land use sustainability through collective
decision making, and emphasize the importance of long-
term strategies to support incentive programs if policy
goals are to be reached. Games can provide initial moti-
vation for policy design, serve as a final test bed before
policies are implemented, or help participants understand
newly implemented programs. Recent appointments of
behavioral scientists to high-level government posi-
tions in the United States and the United Kingdom
(Kahneman 2013) demonstrate a growing thirst among
policy makers for insights like those our study provides.
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